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John Nash and Lloyd Shapley
Mathematicians who made fundamental contributions to game
theory.
Received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994 and 2012,
respectively.
Nash was portrayed in the movie A Beautiful Mind.
The Nash Equilibrium
A Nash Equilibrium is a stable state in the game in which no
player can increase their expected profit by changing their
strategy.
Nash and Shapley found the Nash-Equilibrium strategies for
this game by solving a system of equations involving 24
variables.
We call the Nash Equilibrium strategy optimal. However, it is
only optimal when playing against skilled players. As we will
see, these ”optimal” strategies are far from optimal against
certain player types.
The Optimal Strategy
The strategy Nash and Shapley found is nearly identical to the
naive strategy with a few exceptions:
Player 1: Sandbags with a certain probability when given a
low card.
Player 2: When Player 1 passes and Player 2 has a high card,
Player 2 will sandbag with the same probability as Player 1.
Player 3: Bluffs with a certain probability when given a low
card and Players 1 and 2 both pass.
Player Profiles
Naive: Player always bets on high cards and always passes
on low cards.
Random: Player bets or passes with equal probability,
regardless of the value of his or her card or the actions of
other players.
Loose (Aggressive): Player always bets when holding a high
card and bets with a given probability when given a low card.
Tight (Conservative): Player does not always bet when
holding a high card and never bets on a low card.
The Nash-Shapley Poker Model
Simplified model with three players and only two types of cards: a high card and a low card.
Each player pays a fixed ante a and either bets b, or passes in a game lasting up to five rounds.
(We considered the case where a = 1 and b = 2).
Motivating Questions
What is the effect of player position on expected profit?
What is the best response to different player profiles, given a player’s position?
Under what circumstances is cooperation favored over competition?
How close do simulations approximate theoretical values?
Effect of Player Position
When playing optimally, Players 1 and 2
follow the same strategy and eventually
receive the same negative profit.
The expected profit of all players is 0
when they each follow the naive
strategy.
The fourth and fifth rounds give Player 1
an advantage when all players play
randomly.
Best Response to Different Player Profiles
Effect of Player Position on Common Response
Profits for Players 2 and 3 assuming Optimal Play under different strategies
for Player 1.
Player 1 Best Response and Expected Profit
On average, Naive tends to be the best response strategy for Player 1.
We see that Optimal is a highly specialized strategy.
Cooperation vs. Competition
Under the assumption Player 3 plays optimally, Player 2 has a
strictly dominating strategy of Naive, regardless of what Player
1 will choose.
Assuming common rationality, Player 1 will know this and will
therefore choose Naive to optimize their expected profit. Thus,
this leads us to one of our equilibrium in a dynamic game
setting.
Comparing the Naive and Optimal strategy profits of Players 1
and 2, they are better off both playing optimally (cooperation),
than playing naively (competition).
Additional Findings
Given that all three players use the same strategy, Player 2’s
expected profit is always bounded by Player 1 and 3’s.
If we change the Nash-Shapley model from a static game, to a
dynamic one (introduce the ability to change strategies), we
encounter two equilibria. One stable (Naive, Naive, Optimal)
and one unstable (Optimal, Optimal, Optimal).
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